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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  14-4331 
________________ 
 
IN RE: JEVIC HOLDING CORP., et al., 
                                               Debtors 
 
 
CASIMIR CZYZEWSKI; MELVIN L. MYERS; 
JEFFREY OEHLERS; ARTHUR E. PERIGARD; 
DANIEL C. RICHARDS, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
                                                     Appellants 
                    
v. 
 
JEVIC TRANSPORTATION, INC.; JEVIC HOLDING CORP; 
CREEK ROAD PROPERTIES, LLC; SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS, 
INC.; JOHN DOES 1-10 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-01127)  
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 27, 2015 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 27, 2016) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 In this adversary proceeding, part of a broader bankruptcy case, plaintiffs Casimir 
Czyzewski et al. appeal an order granting summary judgment to Sun Capital Partners, 
Inc. (SCPI) on plaintiffs’ claim that SCPI and debtors Jevic Transportation, Inc. 
(“Jevic”), Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic Holding”), and Creek Road Properties, LLC were 
a “single employer” under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (“WARN Act”). The WARN Act provides “[a]n employer shall not 
order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the employer 
serves written notice of such an order” to each affected employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) 
(2012). “[I]ndependent contractors and subsidiaries which are wholly or partially owned 
by a parent company are treated as . . . a part of the parent or contracting company”—that 
is, as a single employer—“depending upon the degree of their independence from the 
parent.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (2015).  
 For the reasons given in the well-reasoned opinions of the District Court and 
Bankruptcy Court, we will affirm.1 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 157(b)(1), and 
1334(b). It noted the adversary proceeding was a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
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I. 
 The debtors in the broader bankruptcy case are Jevic, Jevic Holding, and Creek 
Road Properties, LLC. All the debtors’ operations occurred through Jevic. Jevic, a now-
bankrupt trucking company, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jevic Holding, which is 
itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sun Transportation, LLC. SCPI owns 100 percent of 
the equity in Sun Transportation, LLC. SCPI created Sun Transportation, LLC and Jevic 
Holding to acquire the debtors. SCPI’s co-Chief Executive Officers are Rodger R. Krouse 
and Marc J. Leder. 
 In 2006, Sun Transportation, LLC acquired the debtors in a leveraged buyout. The 
buyout gave Jevic access to an $85 million revolving credit facility from a bank group led 
by CIT Group/Business Credit, Inc. (“CIT”). Upon the acquisition, Jevic and SCPI 
entered into a management-services agreement governing the relationship between them. 
Jevic struggled through 2007 and eventually its assets fell below the level required to 
maintain its credit facility from CIT. In March 2008, SCPI chose not to invest more 
money in Jevic, and Jevic began an active sale process. After meetings with buyers did 
not produce a sale, on May 16, 2008, Jevic’s board authorized a bankruptcy filing. Jevic 
then sent its employees termination notices under the WARN Act, which they received 
on May 19, 2008. Jevic filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy the next day, May 20. 
                                                                                                                                                  
157(b)(2)(A), 157(b)(2)(B), and 157(b)(2)(O). The District Court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
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 On May 21, 2008, plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit alleging Jevic and SCPI 
were a “single employer” for purposes of the WARN Act. The Bankruptcy Court 
certified the class. 
 During discovery, plaintiffs deposed twelve people. They also asked to depose 
Krouse and Leder. After SCPI moved for a protective order, the Bankruptcy Court 
quashed plaintiffs’ notices of the depositions of Krouse and Leder. 
 SCPI and plaintiffs each moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ single-
employer claim. The Bankruptcy Court held Jevic and SCPI were not a single employer 
under the WARN Act. Accordingly, it granted SCPI’s motion and denied plaintiffs’ 
motion. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 492 B.R. 416 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013). Subsequently, 
plaintiffs appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court in all 
respects. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 526 B.R. 547 (D. Del. 2014). Plaintiffs appealed. 
II. 
 We review de novo the legal conclusions in a WARN Act “single employer” 
liability determination made on summary judgment. In re APA Transp. Corp. Consol. 
Litig., 541 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2008). We construe the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a decision to quash a subpoena for abuse of discretion. 
NLRB v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1992). 
III. 
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 Plaintiffs raise the same two claims of error they raised in the District Court. First, 
they contend the Bankruptcy Court erred by holding SCPI was not a single employer with 
Jevic under the WARN Act. Second, they contend the Bankruptcy Court erred by 
quashing their notices of the depositions of Krouse and Leder. 
A. 
 To determine whether two business enterprises are a single employer under the 
WARN Act, we apply the five-factor test we adopted in Pearson v. Component 
Technology Corporation, 247 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2001), and clarified in APA Transp. 
Corp. The five factors are “(1) common ownership, (2) common directors and/or officers, 
(3) de facto exercise of control, (4) unity of personnel policies emanating from a common 
source, and (5) dependency of operations.” APA Transp. Corp., 541 F.3d at 243. The 
five-factor test is a balancing test, but the factors are not balanced equally. Id. Satisfying 
“the first and second factors, common ownership and common directors and/or officers, 
[is] not sufficient to establish that two entities are a ‘single employer.’” Id. And “if the de 
facto exercise of control was particularly striking—for instance, were it effectuated by 
disregard[ing] the separate legal personality of its subsidiary—then liability might be 
warranted even in the absence of the other factors.” Pearson, 247 F.3d at 504 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, SCPI does not dispute the lower courts’ findings that the first two factors 
were satisfied. But plaintiffs and SCPI dispute whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the final three factors. 
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 The third factor, de facto exercise of control, tests whether “the parent or lender 
was the decisionmaker responsible for the employment practice giving rise to the 
litigation.” Id. at 503–04. We agree with the courts below that plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated the genuine dispute of material fact necessary to survive summary 
judgment with respect to this factor. 
 The Bankruptcy Court found that “the facts in Pearson [are] analogous to the facts 
of this case” and “as a practical matter [the secured creditor] exerted even more control in 
Pearson than [SCPI] is alleged to have done here.” J.A. 34. And the District Court held 
that “any alleged oversight during the process leading up to filing for bankruptcy [wa]s 
significantly lower than in Pearson where the indebted party was required to seek 
approval for many of its decisions.” Id. at 15 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). The facts in APA Transp. Corp. are also analogous to the facts of this case. In 
APA Transp. Corp., we found that “while APA Truck Leasing may have made certain 
loans to APA Transport and shared certain administrative functions, it was not 
‘controlling’ APA Transport and played no role in APA Transport’s decision to close its 
facilities.” 541 F.3d at 245. Here, as the courts below found, “it remains undisputed that 
the Debtors made the decisions to shut down the company” and “Jevic was directly 
responsible for signing the WARN notice and terminating employees.” J.A. 15 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 Plaintiffs contend that because SCPI’s actions overwhelmed Jevic, SCPI should be 
subject to single-employer liability based on the “de facto exercise of control” factor 
7 
 
alone. We disagree. We see no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the third 
factor and hold that this factor weighs in favor of SCPI. 
 The fourth factor, unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, 
tests “whether the companies actually functioned as a single entity with regard to [their] 
relationships with employees.” Pearson, 247 F.3d at 499. Both courts below found the 
record was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to this 
factor. As the District Court found, plaintiffs “failed to produce evidence that appellee 
directly hired or fired Jevic employees, paid the salaries of Jevic employees or shared a 
personnel or benefits recordkeeping system with Jevic.” J.A. 17 (emphasis removed). 
Plaintiffs contend SCPI shared certain personnel-related programs with Jevic and policed 
Jevic’s personnel actions. But the companies in APA Transp. Corp. shared “certain 
benefit plans and some employee monitoring functions” too. 541 F.3d at 245. Plaintiffs’ 
specific allegations here—that SCPI set up and oversaw an incentive compensation 
program for Jevic’s management, that Leder reviewed the proposal for the program, and 
that SCPI once proposed $3 million in headcount cuts—do not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact about “whether the companies actually functioned as a single entity with 
regard to [their] relationships with employees.” Pearson, 247 F.3d at 499.  
 The fifth factor, dependency of operations, addresses whether two business 
enterprises “shar[e] administrative or purchasing services,” “interchange[] employees or 
equipment,” and “commingle[] finances.” Id. at 500. Requests for approval of actions do 
not alone demonstrate dependency of operations without evidence the parent was 
“involved in the details or manner of implementation of any . . . business plans” of the 
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subsidiary. Id. at 502. Similarly, the mere fact a subsidiary “was financially dependent on 
[the parent’s] loans, and ultimately was unable to stay afloat without them” is insufficient 
to demonstrate dependency of operations. Id. at 503. The Bankruptcy Court noted it was 
“undisputed that Jevic maintained separate books and records, had its own bank accounts, 
[] prepared its own financial statements,” and “did not share administrative services, 
facilities, or equipment with [SCPI].” J.A. 40. It also found “no evidence that [SCPI] 
employees were involved in the day-to-day business operations of Jevic sufficient to 
show an existence of dependency.” Id. The District Court agreed with this analysis. 
 Plaintiffs now argue Jevic depended on the administrative arrangements it shared 
with SCPI, SCPI was involved in the creation, details, and manner of implementation of 
Jevic’s business plans, and SCPI undercapitalized Jevic and extracted management fees 
from it. But their support for these claims is thin, and does not demonstrate dependency 
of operations. SCPI continued to operate without incident after Jevic folded, just as APA 
Truck Leasing continued to operate without incident after APA Transport folded. See 
APA Transp. Corp., 541 F.3d at 245. In short, plaintiffs’ claims are insufficient to create 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the companies’ dependency of operations. 
 We have held there is no single-employer liability when “the final three factors are 
clearly in favor of” a company opposing such liability. Id. That is the case here. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
B. 
 Plaintiffs also contend the Bankruptcy Court should have permitted them to 
depose Krouse and Leder. They contend Krouse and Leder had particularized and 
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specific knowledge of SCPI’s business practices and the critical interactions and 
decisions that are the focus of this litigation. But as SCPI points out, plaintiffs “do not 
suggest that this alleged ‘err[or]’ itself warrants reversal of the judgment.” Br. Appellees 
54. Instead, plaintiffs contend they should be permitted to take Krouse’s and Leder’s 
depositions in the event this case is remanded for further proceedings. Because we will 
not remand this case, we need not reach this issue. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
